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DEAN POUND AND THE END OF LAW
KARL KREILKAMPt

I.

The Efficacy of Deliberate Effort

LEARNED in the history of legal and political thought and action,
Dean Pound is also-he would say, by virtue of this very fact-an
ardent advocate of legal reform.
Now the minute a man promotes reform, he declares himself an
opponent of positivism; for a doctrine of reform, whether its protagonist
knows it or not, always supposes at least two beliefs: that what is to
be changed for the better possesses in some way an ideal form that is
not yet fully realized, and that men are somehow free to take a deliberate
hand in that work of realization. Dean Pound is quite aware of his
position. Indeed, not the least of his efforts have gone into the negative
task of overthrowing the philosophies that deny to human ideals and
purposes any efficacy in the molding of law.
It seems strange that jurists, of all people, should be found among the
determinists. The reality of free-will ought surely to be most patent in
practical life; and surely in judicial decisions, if ever in human affairs,
men are seen honoring with at least public obeisance an intellectual idea
-the idea of justice. Nonetheless, as we well know, jurisprudence has
not escaped the determinist error, a fact amply attested by Pound's
vehement and insistent attacks.
"Law is not like a natural phenomenon whose workings have to be accounted
for by observation and discovery of a theory that will fit the facts. What
is law depends not merely upon the facts of the past and of the present but
also upon the will of those who prescribe and those who administer rules of
conduct by the authority of the state; and this will is determined not a little
by their theory of what they do and why they do it."'
"The law has lived and grown through juristic activity under the influence
of ideas of natural right and justice or of reasonableness, not force, as the
'2
ultimate source of authority."
".. . the believers in eighteenth-century natural law did great things in the
development of American law because that theory gave faith that they could
do them."
t

3

Author of THE MErAPHmYsIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF Tuonsnic JUIfsPRUDENcm (1939).
1. The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence(1911) 24 HIARv. L. Rav. 591, 598.
[All articles and works hereinafter cited are by Dean Pound, unless otherwise noted.]
2. A New School of Jurists in 4 THE UNIVERsITY STUDIES OF Ma UNIVERSITY or
NEBRASKA (1904) 17.
3. TnE FoR ATIVE ERA or A_ aucAN LAw (1938) 27; cf. The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence (1912) 25 HArv. L. REv. 489, 492, 495; LAw AND MoArs (1924)
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Legal determinism has shown itself in a variety of forms. Race, the
survival of the fittest, economic facts, class-conflict, legal tradition,
various Hegelian ideas--each of these, by some school or other, has
been exalted to the r6le of exclusive determinant of human law.' Pound
finds none adequate by itself to explain all the legal phenomena that
he knows about-and his knowledge is not scant. What is more important, all such theories suffer from blindness to what Pound calls "the
efficacy of effort", that is, conscious striving after ideals. Croce characterizes historical determinism in these words:
"To conceive of history as evolution and progress implies accepting it as
5
necessary in all its parts and therefore denying validity to judgments upon it.'"
This is precisely the doctrine that Pound attacks. The course of human
history is not wholly comprised of necessary events. It is partly the
effect of a free factor, human effort. Man is not wholly a creature of
physical forces, he is partly their master.
'Living things must accept their environment. Yet life does not of necessity
accept its environment in a purely passive fashion. It seeks to control the
environment so as to make adjustment thereto in some sort involve mastery
over it. As Ward puts it, our attitude toward nature is twofold. It is that
of a student, but it is also that of a master. Man cannot prevent earthquakes
or eruptions or tornadoes or floods or droughts or fires. But he can plan and
build and organize so as to minimize their effects."
In human life the struggle against nature takes the form of deliberate
activity, activity instigated by an ideal. The efficacy of effort is the
efficacy of ideals.7
Nowadays there exists a special need for teaching this truth. "Economic determinism is now as definitely fashionable as historical deter35; LNTERPRErTAIONS or LEGAL HisoRY (1923) cc. II-V; A. Iro 0ucno:. To Tirm PnrrosoPny or LAW (1922) 15-16; A Comparison of Ideals of Law (1933) 47 HAzv. L. Rm. 1, 2;
Wlat Is the Common Law in HAnV.D TERCR,.n,%RY PTcrzxc\7tos (1937); The Ideal
Elffnent in American Judidal Decision (1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 136; TUn Foamm.n'z EnA
or A=c._, LAw, 93-94.

4.
5.

ITFRPRETATiONS OF LEGAL HISTORY.
STORIA DELLA STORIOGRAFI ITA LNA NEL SECOLO D EMONONO, 1, 26, cited in Iurm-

PRETATiONS OF LEaAL HisToRy at 66.
6. The Social Order and Modern Life in TnE Cm-%Twn

IN.TELIGENCE MmDMoz

Lnt

(1928) 76.
7. As examples in legal history, take the influence of Puritanism on the common law
[TE Spnur or THE Commo LAW (1921) 32-59] and the influence of the theories of
contract on the history of that institution. (An LNrcODUfO TO THE PxInwsoru Or LAwo
236-284).
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minism was fifty years ago."18 Years ago Pound had to oppose the
"juristic pessimism" of the Historical School of jurisprudence and the
Analytical School's blindness to the fact that judges help make law; now
it is the Realists who deny the efficacy of effort and the influence of
ideals and doubt the value of a system that permits the play of such
illusions as abstract ideals.
It was through a study of legal history that Pound arrived at his
perception of the efficacy of ideals. From history he drew the psychological truth that "Men tend to do what they think they are doing",'
and he uses it as a foundation for his division of legal history into periods
that differ according to their varying ideal pictures of law. It is his
contention that by becoming acquainted with a period's idea of the nature
and end of law, you take a long step towards understanding the actual
legal order of that period. Hence Pound defines human law as
".. . the body of materials which by reason of having been prescribed or traditionally received ought to be and hence in a large view usually are the basis
of decision."' 0
Only upon a definition of law that includes the traditionally received
materials and techniques, the ideal element in law, can we understand,
on the one hand, the conservatism of legal systems-how they have
often, rightly or wrongly, resisted and even eventually ignored legislated innovations." Again, only when we take into account the ideas
about the end of law that are not yet expressed in the authoritative
materials, do we, on the other hand, begin to understand much of the
change that has occurred throughout the history of law; Pound never
tires of insisting upon the dynamism inherent in the notion of a natural
law (by which he means any ideal picture of the legal order' 2 ), its ability
to stimulate jurists and legislators into the activity of abolishing or
modifying existent laws and of creating new ones. 13
8.

American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Century in A Cmruav or SocaAL
(1939) 160; cf. id. at 162-164; What Is the Common Law, supra note 3, at 5, 6;
How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twentieth Century Jitristic
Thought? (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 81; Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems
of Law (1933) 7 TULANE L. REv. 475; The Church and Legal History in JUDBMF LAW
LEcruEms (1939) 91-97; A Comparison of Ideals of Law, supra note 3, at 3, 4; The Call
for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HIARv. L. R-v. 697-700; Public Law and Private Law
(1939) 24 Coa'r. L. Q. 469, 478-482.
9. The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, loc. cit. supra note 3.
10. Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, supra note 8, at 479.
11. THE FORmAT=V ERA OF AM:ERICAN LAW, 38-80.
12. "Ever since [the time of the Roman jurists], systems of legal ideals have gone by
the name of natural law." Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 16-30, 93-94; AN INTRODUMTON TO THE. PnLosopnY OF LAW (1922) 33-34.
TnouGcH

19401

DEAN POUND AND THE END OF LAW

Once the lesson of history is learned, that men do what they think
they are doing, then and only then is it time to talk about what we
should now do with our own legal system. The Realists must be taught
this lesson in psychology if they are to be diverted from their fruitless
derision of judicial principles and conceptions and led to engage in the
more useful task of evaluating those legal ideals.
"Faithful portrayal of what courts and law makers and jurists do is not the
whole task of a science of law. One of the conspicuous actualities of the legal
order is the impossibility of divorcing what they do from the question what
they ought to do or what they feel they ought to do. For by and large they
are trying to do what they ought to do. Their picture of what they ought to
do is often decisive in determining what they do. Such pictures are actualities
quite as much as the materials of legal precepts or doctrines upon which or
with which they work. Critical portrayals of the ideal element in law, valuings
of traditional ideals with respect to the actualities of the social and legal order,
and the results to which they lead in the social and legal order of today, are as
much in touch with reality (i.e. have to do with things of at least as much sigtheories of the behavior of
nificance for the legal order) as psychological
14
particular judges in particular cases."
The fact that ideals influence human conduct must be learned, says
Pound, by two types of men: certain theorists, who deny it explicitly
(such as the waning Analyticists and the waxing Realists); and the
so-called men of action, who deny it implicitly when they suppose that
the reform of government presupposes a change only in the governmental system and not in the ideas of the men who conduct that system.
Would we remedy the present lag between legal institutions and social
needs, says Pound, we must abandon the projects for changing our
judicial machinery (which is not to blame) and seek instead a conversion of judicial minds from individualism to a philosophy that gives
proper recognition to social interests.
"The right course is not to tinker with our courts and with our judicial organization in the hope of bringing about particular results in particular kinds
of cases at a sacifice of all that we have learned or ought to have learned from
legal and judicial history. It is rather to provide a new set of premises, a
new order of ideas in such form that the courts may use them and develop
them into a modem system by judicial experience of actual causes." 1 0
A distressing witness to the practical power of ideals is at hand now in
14. The Call for a Relist Jurisprudence,supra note 8, at 700.
IS. Ti Sprr oF TnE Commo.x Ltw, 190; cf. What Is he Common La-, loc. cit.
s ra note 3.
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the insistent opposition with which the theory of individualism, as
embodied in the anachronistic attitudes of the American pioneer and the
nineteenth-century Liberal, harasses current movements of legal reform.
"In a long view what is likely to prove hardest and to retard and make ineffective our efforts at adjustment will be not stubborn facts but stubborn
6
theories."'
And if the positivist interpretation of the judicial process comes to
dominate our courts and our law schools, we shall have further distressing evidence of the power of ideal pictures.
"... a more anti-social theory of law-making than that implied in the economic interpretation, as grafted on analytical jurisprudence by American posi7

tivists, could not be conceived."'

"Theories of what men are doing have a controlling effect on what men do
and how they do it. Thus we are likely to get a vicious circle. Taught that
they cannot in the nature of things act otherwise than arbitrarily and upon
prejudice and class self-interest, officials are likely to give up trying to do
anything else."' 8
Granting that ideas, as well as physical factors, go into the formation
of every legal system, the important question arises: What ideal picture
of law will be chosen? What theory both explains the course of legal
history and provides a norm for the present and the future? Pound
rates this the Number One problem facing jurisprudence today. To those
who ban it as an illegitimate and meaningless question for a science
based on objective data he says:
"[If we refuse to criticize the legal order according to criteria of value] we
succeed in nothing more than relegating our main problem to some other
branch of learning where we shall still meet it once more in our path as the
main obstacle to be overcome. .

.

.Nothing, then, is gained by taking refuge

from this difficult problem in a doctrine of irreducible antinomies, or in skeptical
realism, or in a relativist logicism, inviting every one to take his own starting
point, or in an analytical jurisprudence confined to the authoritative legal
materials as they are and postulating that the judicial process in action accords
with them."' 9
16.

The Social Order and Moderm Life, supra note 6, at 101.

17.

INTERPRETATIONS OF LEAL

isTORY,

113.

18. The Church and Legal History, supra note 8, at 94.
19. American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Century, supra note 8, at 170-171;
cf. id. at 147; AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PnILOsOPHY OF LAW, 89-90; How Far Are
We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twentieth Century Juristic Thought?, supra
note 8, at 81; The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,supra note 8, at 697; The Ideal Element
in American JudicialDecision, supra note 3, at 147; THE FORmATIVE ERA OF AMERCAN LAW,
28-29.
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In his answer to this ethical question Pound, though he does not by
any means go the whole way, does take a long step towards the Scholastic natural law, long at least in comparison with the distance separating
us from most modern jurists. There are parts of his view, and these
not the least important, which are identical with the corresponding parts
of the Scholastic view. At the same time we find crucial omissions.
I deal first with the identities.
II. The Functiotudity of Law
About the time of the Civil War a number of historical factors collaborated in stopping the growth of the American legal system. The
expansion of the country was beginning to slow down, and that meant
that American jurists had to turn their energy from the old task of
bending the strict and highy social aspects of the common law to meet
the frontier conditions, towards the new task of freezing legal change as
much as possible. Society's greatest need was no longer to provide the
conditions most conducive to the settling of new land, but rather to
stabilize the life of older communities. Corresponding to this general
drift in judicial practice, says Pound, there arose in judicial thought the
Analytical School of jurisprudence. It is largely out of his opposition to
this theory and to the other nineteenth-century non-creative views of
law, which he considers to have outlived their social usefulness, that
Pound's own view takes shape.
"The philosophical jurist was too prone to find ingenious philosophical justification for rules and doctrines and institutions which had outlived the conditions for which they arose and had ceased to yield just results. The historical jurist was too prone to find a justification for an arbitrary rule in the
fact that it was the culmination of a historical development. The analytical
jurist banished all ethical considerations, all criticism of legal precepts with
reference to morals, from the law books. If the precept could be fitted logically
into a logically consistent legal system, it was enough. Such things are intelligble... in a stage of legal development, following a period of growth, when
it was expedient for a time to assimilate and systematize the results of creative
judicial and juristic activity."20
It is a central dogma of the Analyticists-and their radical error,
according to Pound-that the judge has no hand in creating the law.'
For them the judge is a mechanical mouthpiece of the legislator, his only
function being to apply to individual cases the general command of the
20. LAw A-D MoRALs, 86; cf. The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,
supra note 1.
21.

LAw A-%DMORALs, 48-58.
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lawgiver, on the presumption that all future situations occasioning litigation were foreseen and regulated in the legislator's intention at the
moment of lawgiving 2
It is evident that by so shutting the door to
judicial creativity such a theory served the conservative requirements
of the times.
Pound's reading of legal history, however, convinces him that this
view of American government offends truth about the past no less than
it hampers progress in the future.2 3 We must recognize, he says, that
the judge helps mold the legal system. He always has in the past, and
he must now if the law is to be a serviceable instrument to men and not
a dead weight on their backs. His argument is simply the story of the
courts' creativity in history 24 and, more generally, the absurdity of
supposing an omniscient legislator; no man can read the future in the
detail necessary for deciding the locus of justice in every case of the
class governed by a given precept." The judge, moreover, is in closer
touch with the detailed social facts, especially under the common-law
empirical technique of working out the formulation of law.20
Whether or not we approve of Pound's opposition to the separation of
political powers in the case of judicial lawmaking, it shows us the origin
of one of his primary tenets, the functionality of law. If the judge
becomes conscious of being required frequently to turn legislator and
choose between two or more possible policies of legal control, establish a
precedent for future application and thereby dictate how the law's
subjects shall conduct themselves in certain situations in the future, then
he must ask about the law's effects upon the social situations and activities they are designed to govern, "rather than whether their abstract
content is abstractly just. The moment we ask such questions, however, we are driven to inquire as to the end of law. For function means
function towards some end."2 7 The judge must learn the truth that the
law is not an end in itself. The ordinary factory worker needs to know
nothing of the reasons for the technical process he performs, but his
superiors, who must fit that process to purposes that unify the operation
of the factory as a whole, must know those ends and must be able to
keep up with changing ends and changing conditions by the necessary
22. AN INTRODUCTION TO TuE Psmosopny or LAW, 53-54.
23. LAW AND MORALS, 43-88.
ERA OF A-1Amuc
LAW, 81-137; LAW AND MORALS, c. 2, The Ania24. THE FORmATI
lytical View; INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 130-140; An INTRODUCTION TO THE
P~mosoPmY oF LAW, c. 3, The Application of Law.
25. TH Spnmi" or mHE CommoN LAW, 174.
26. Id. at 173 et seq.; What Is the Common Law, supra note 3.
27. How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twentieth Century Juristic
Thought?, supra note 8, at 90; cf. A New School of Jurists, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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technological changes. If the existent law is imperfect and must be
modified by human action, then it cannot be an absolute end, but must
be the mere servant of an outside end. What is changeable is not an
end in itself.
You may be surprised that such a commonplace should be dignified
with the importance Pound gives it or that it should be deemed needful
of much defense, but not if you know the state of jurisprudence at the
time when he began writing. Pound had to teach the Analyticists that
human law is something relative, something for men to take and change
and use for their own purposes-within many limitations, of course. And he had also to counteract the influence of the determinism of the
other important nineteenth-century schools and convince men that they
could modify human law.2 9 The extent of the judges' respect for existent
law is shown by their one-time refusal to permit any radical changes
through legislation; they presumed on the part of the lawgiver an intention that every new piece of legislation should be interpreted as consonant
with the common law's first principles, in spite of the fact that this
presumption contradicted the legislator's power of lawmaking. Legislators could make law, yes, but they must not change the character of
the common law. The principles of the common law were conceived
to be perfect for all time, adequate to the function of regulating any
and every set of social circumstances; 0 common-law rights of Englishmen and Americans were identified with the inalienable natural rights
of man, and our Constitution took on the immutability of the
natural law.31
If we grant the need of legal changes at the beginning of the present
century, then we must commend Pound for attacking the defeatism and
complacency of that time, and for spreading a consciousness of the
elementary truth that law is essentially a changeable instrument-just
as now we commend him for assailing the legal positivists, who go to the
other extreme of violating the law's need of stability and continuity.
III. The Immediate End of Law: The Social Interest
If human law is only a means, what is its end? It is designed to serve
a good outside itself, but what good? Here again Pound's teaching
28. Fifty Years of Jurispruderce (1937) So HARV. L. Ray. 557.
29.

LrsRa'rAnioxs or LruAL. HisToRy.

30. The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 25 HE[nv. L. Rmy. 140,
148; Justice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L. R ,.103, 11Tn.
31. T-E Spnrr or TH COmmoN LAw, 95-98; I,-r.TzrA1LTo1;S or T La.HImony, 41;
Ri
L.xw, 26-27. See also The Ideal Elewert in American
T
F,-1mX
- TE ERA or A aaxc

Judicial Deciion, supra note 3, at 142, where Pound speaks of the "common law natural
law."
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shows a negative and a positive side. Delimiting the true (immediate)
end of law entails condemning the current misconceptions, among which
we find the influential error of individualism. By different routes the
dominant social and legal philosophies of the nineteenth century, both
in America and abroad, arrived at the common conclusion that the
immediate end of law lies in giving expression to the free-will of the
individual subjects." Kantian and Hegelian ethics offered a philosophical justification for the Continental champions of laissez-faire. Kant
made right the end of law and defined it as
".. . the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any
one person may be harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every
'33
other person according to a universal law of freedom.
For Kant any legal precept is just if it supports the equilibrium of
free-wills. Individual freedom is the political goal; insofar as a social
situation involves a deliberate contract, it embodies the legal idea. And
Hegel says, "This is right: that existence generalized is existence of the
free will. Accordingly generalized it is freedom as an idea.13 4 These
statements boil down to an asseveration that the law exists to implement
the individual subject's free choices; and no matter what those wills
want, justice obtains as long as they are in harmony one with another.
Reason takes on the character of tyrant; it "is not the principle of
freedom but is rather an element in human nature antagonistic to
freedom."'
Since voluntary action is action flowing from the individual's own personal choice rather than from the determination of preexistent social relations and authority's commands, this legal ideal is
individualistic. Its objective is a maximum of individual self-assertion.
Philosophy yielded this ideological defense of individualism. Facts of
modern history suggested such a political philosophy." The great flux
of economic phenomena at the beginning of the modern period dictated
a change in social forms. Where new adaptations to environment were
necessary on such a scale, a large increase in individually initiated
32. THE SPIRIT OF THE COmmoN LAW, c. 6, The Philosophy of Law in the Nineteenth
Century; LAW AND MORALS, c, 3, The Philosophical View; How Far Are We Attaining

a New Measure of Values in Twentieth Century Juristic Thought? supra note 8, at 82-84.
33.

METAmpysiscHE ANFANGSGRUNDE

DER RECHTSLEIIRE (1797),

Introduction, § B, 3,

cited in LAW A5N MORALS, 11, n. 24.
34.

GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS, 61,

cited in

INTERPRETATIONS OF LECAL

HISTORY, 46n.

35.

PUCHTA, CURSUS DER INSTITUTIONEM, § 2, cited in INTERPRETATIONS OF LEOAL HIS-

TORY, 47n.

36.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHnosoPiy OF

LAW, 38-54, 79-81.
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activity was required-in the settling of new lands,3 for example-and
it was sensible then, Pound thinks, for the law to extend the boundaries
of individual freedom. And in the formation of Anglo-American law
the conffict of courts and crown inspired by Stuart tyranny left its mark
in the form of an attitude that regards law as primarily a bulwark protecting the individual against the government.s
Individualists of the Historical School of jurisprudence interpreted
legal history as the unfolding of this one idea, the individual's progression from status to contract, that is, from limited legal recognition
as a responsible and free-willing person to more and more such recognition and less and less liability for faults not willed, less and less treatment as a social unit. Pound, however, labels this reading of history false.
It is "refuted by the whole course of development of the law ... in the last
generation, unless indeed we have been progressing backward." 39
He adduces facts drawn from judicial decision and legislation to show
that
".... limitation of free contract and imposition of duties and liabilities as incidents of relations instead of exclusively as the consequences of manifested
will, have gone forward steadily ....
But Pound finds nothing more false than to suppose that the law's
prime purpose is to establish conditions under which individuals enjoy a
maximum of self-assertion. This view will neither explain the forms of
legal systems in the past nor provide any help'as a standard in solving
our present and future legal problems. History shows us that the
chronologically first concrete end of law was the general security.
Primitive systems of law do not devote themselves to fostering the
development of the personalities of individuals. They aim rather at
setting the conditions of social life.
"Nineteenth-century individualism wrote legal history as the record of a
continually strengthening and increasing securing of the logical deductions from
individual freedom in the form of individual rights, and hence as a product
of the pressure of individual claims or wants or desires. But this is just what
it is not. It is not too much to say that the social interest in the general
37. Tim Snur or = Co~imoz LAw, c. 5, The Pio;necrs and the Law, 112-133; Tim
FoiRmnvE ERA or AmRIcAN..

LAW, 6-3.

38. THx Snrr or = Comsmozq LA,

c. 3, The Courts and the Crown, C-.4; Cnram.,AL

Jusnrc
mM
cA (1930) 105; Tim FOnRLrVE Eu. or Anuc.. LAW, 5S.
39. Lv.RETAT,IONS or Lrz.L HISrtoY, 60; cf. How Far Are We Attaining a New
Measure of Values in Twentieth Century Juristi Thought? supra note 8, at 85-S7.
40. hqTmPRErATIONS or LEGl. HlsToRY, 61; cf. Tim Srror oF Tn Co =o:; LAW,
135-189.
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security,, in its lowest terms of an interest in peace and order, dictated the
very beginnings of law." 41
As an example take the truce or peace, "the most fruitful of the institutions of Germanic law".4 2 This primitive legal institution established
certain suspensions of feud and private vengeance. From an individualist standpoint these exemptions were in direct contradiction of the
primary end of law, which was the mothering of individual selfexpression. What dictated the formation of such exemptions and suspensions was rather the human need for maintaining the social order,
by supporting the activities and relations that comprised it. In Pound's
language, the various types of peace or truce were "expressions or recognitions of the paramount social interest in the general security."'
Primitive law is characterized by just this rudimentary conception of the
general security, a conception that "puts satisfaction of the social want
of general security, stated in its lowest terms, as the purpose of the
legal order." 44
History shows us in general terms that the career of legal systems has
always been determined largely by two opposing pulls, one towards stability and the other towards change; "Law must be stable and yet it
cannot stand still."45 The need for continual modification in the formulation and application of laws follows from the incessant change occurring
in the human and physical materials those laws are supposed to organize.
But without a large measure of stability in the legal system the society
will disintegrate; men must be able to count on the future if they are
going to live peaceably in the co6perative associations that law helps
maintain and control. It is a generalization drawn from' the facts of
history, to say that the social interest in the general security is the first
determinant of law.
"In the last century legal history was written as a record of the unfolding of
individual freedom, as a record of continually increasing recognition and securing of individual interests through the pressure, as it were of the individual
will. But it would be quite as easy to write it in terms of a continually wider
and broader recognition and securing of social interests, that is, of the claims
and demands involved in the existence of civilized society

. . .

the beginnings

an interpretation than to the orthoof law lend themselves much more to such
' 40
dox interpretation of the last century."
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

THE Spnut oF =n COmoNO LAW, 206.
Ibid.; cf. CamrAL Jusnca 3N AmERCA, 83-84.
THE SPmRIT oF THE ComsoN LAWV, 207.
AN INmoDucrioN To Tn PnrosoPirY or LAW, 72-73.
INTE.RPETATIONS OF LEGAL HILSTORY, 1. This is a leitmotiv in all of Pound's writings.

Id. at 163-164.
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Individualism, then, fails to explain for us the primary characteristics
of the world's legal systems. (This is not to say that individual selfexpression has never been an objective of law-it has always been among
the subsidiary ends, and it rose to a height of much influence during
the nineteenth century. Pound only removes it from the role of foremost end.) Nor can it lead us out of our current legal difficulties. Law
must be looked upon as the instrument first of society and only secondly of the individual:
"The jurisprudence of today catalogues or inventories individual claims, individual wants, individual desires, as did the jurisprudence of the nineteenth
century. Only it does not stop there and assume that these claims inevitably
call for legal recognition and legal securing in and of themselves. It goes on to
ask: What claims, what demands are involved in the existence of the society in
which these individual demands are put forward; how far may these individual
demands be put in terms of those social interests or identified with them, and
when so subsumed under social interests, in so far as they may be so treated,
4
what will give fullest effect to those social interests with the least sacrifice?11 T
The truth of this social view of law has been driven home to us by the
peculiar exigencies of our times generally and of our own American
society particularly.48 The modern industrial world grew out of a world
where social activities outside the family and neighborhood occupied a
much smaller fraction of the individual's day. These new relations had
to be taken over for regulation by the law, for it was the only large
enough agency at hand. Any program of sudden change in social institutions is difficult of execution, and this one was aggravated all the more
by the individualist principles governing (often unconsciously) the
nineteenth-century minds holding the reins of the legal system.' America
added to this dislocation the one afflicting a nation emerging from the
frontier, where individual self-assertion is admittedly the best vehicle
of society's progress, into the city, where society's claims expand at
equal pace with the increase in urban complexity.
Hence the social interest, by and large the foremost determinant of
law since its beginnings,"0 requires a special prominence today, when life
47. Tn Spn=-r o =
H Co~a±mox Lw, 203.
See also Justfce According to Lasw (1914)
14 COL. L. Rgv. 103, 119.
48. CRinAL LAW
%% n AI. mcA. 12-26; l'-Tmrnr.=nos or La. H.sro y, 63.
49. Tim Sn re or = Comanoz LAw, c. 6, The Philosophy of L=1w in the A'inetenth
Century.
50. Like Pound, Scholastics infer from this factual truth a normative principle, namely,
that law should be for the common good. By placing social functionality in the very
d finition of law--ex est ordinaia rationis ad bonum communc-they make the common
good the first criterion for the selection of human interests to be secured by the law. See

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

is characterized by an increasing sociality. To spread a consciousness
of the need for what Pound calls the "socializing" of law is perhaps chief
among the objectives of his teaching. And, in his opinion, the foremost
obstacle to be cleared away is the widespread individualist attitude,
which regards law as at best a necessary evil, whose only excuse is the
service it does to the self-assertion of individuals."1
His concern for the social interest also prompts Pound's current war
against the Realists. However, the Realists do not commit the Individualist's error of denying that the social interest is the proper end of
law; where they go wrong, according to Pound, is in flouting the social
order's need of stability. The Individualist is blind to the general
security; the Realist, to the general security. The fact that the Realists
have lately replaced the Individualists in the jurisprudential limelight
explains why Pound's major emphasis, which used to be on the need
for legal change, is now on the need for stability. It is for the sake of
stability, which is the paramount need of the social order, that Pound
has of late been selecting for special accentuation such of his doctrines
as the supremacy of law, equality before the law, the utility of the postulate of authority, and the importance of reason's part in the judicial
process; just as years ago his emphasis was rather on social facts, which
called for a change in law. 2
IV.

The Ultimate End of Law: Man
1.

Man's Social Needs

So much for Pound's preliminary characterization of the end of law
TAPARELLi D'AzEcLIo, EssAi THEOIuQUE DE DROrr NATUREL (tr. from Italian, 4th ed. Paris,
Leipzig, 1857) I, 1080; VICTOR CATHRIN, S.J., RECHT, NATURRECUT UND rOSITIVES RECUT
(2d ed. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909) 60-61; JOSEPH RicEABY, S.I., POLITICAL AND MORAL
ESSAYS (1902) I, 36; GEORGES RENARD, LE DROIT, L'ORDRE ET LA RAISON (Paris, 1927) 80-82;
A. Molien, Lois in DicTioNNAnR DE TufoLoOwz CATnOLIQUE; Siamo DEPLOIcE, TUE CoNFLiCT BETWEEN Er'scs AND SocIorOGY (tr. by Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C. St. Louis, 1938)
345; BERNARD ROLAND-GOssELIN, LA DocTRIE POLITIIQUE DE SAINT ThouAs D'AQUIN
(Paris, 1928) pt. II, c. II, The Functions of the State; WiLnmria MOLLER, DER STAAT IN
SEIEN BEZimHUNGM ZUR siTTLic=N ORDNUNG BEi THOmAS VON AQUIN (MOnster I.W.
1916) § 2, Die Aufgaben des Staates als sittliche Zwecke, 25-60 and, of course, ST.
ThnomAs AQuINAs, SU2.OfA TIEEOLOGICA (I-II, Questions 90-97, especially Question 90,
Article 2, and Questions 95 and 96) and ON THE GOVERNANCE OF RuLEms (tr. by Gerald B.
Phelan, St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1935).
51. THE SPR OF THE ComimsoN LAW, C. 5, The Pioneers and the Law, 112-138;
CRrwmINAL

JUSTICE IN A.IERICA, 122-131.

52. See The Church and Legal History, supra note 8; A Comparison of Ideals of Law,
supra note 3; What Is the Common Law, supra note 3; Public Law and Private Law,
supra note 8; Hierarchy of Sources and Forms, supra note 8; The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, supra note 8.
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as the service of the social interest; for the sake of clarity we might call
the social interest the primary and proper end of law. But the social
interest is not a self-evident concept; we must go on to ask Pound what
he means by it. If law's primary and proper end consists in the service
of society, what is society for? In other words, what is the udtimate
end of the legal order?
First, what are the concrete social interests that the law must strive
to secure? Besides the general security, which includes peace and order,
general health, and security of transactions and acquisitions, Pound
lists these objects of the social interest: security of social institutions
(domestic, political, and religious), conservation of social resources, the
general morals, general progress (economic, political, and cultural), and
the individual human lfe. 3
One feature of this classification is quite objectionable. Why Should
the individual human life be placed on a level with these other concrete
social interests, when it certainly must be considered the ultimate
(though not the primary and proper) end of society itself and the social
interests? Similarly, the general morals, far from being merely a concrete embodiment of the social interest, are its very end. To understand
these twists in Pound's thought we must recognize the deep division and
opposition that exist for him between the social and the moral. Moral
refers only to the private self-regarding acts of the individual and to the
acts governed by commutative justice; it does not cover activity that
involves a relation and consequent obligations to society as a whole, the
field that for Scholastics is governed by the norm of social justice.
"Equity imposed moral limitations. The law today is beginning to impose
social limitations."' 4
"Equity insisted on moral conduct on the part of creditors. .

.

. We insist

upon protecting men against themselves so as to secure the social interest in
the full moral and social life of every individual.'*' 5
"[Civil society] demands that the individual man be able to live a moral
and social life as a human being."'m
"On the other hand, the moral element plays a much more important part
when we are dealing with conduct than when we have to do with property and
with economic relations [i.e. where the social life is involvvd]..5T
T-E Spmir or = Commo LAw, 208-210; CRarmL JtsnicE = A-umec, 6-9.
The End of Law as Developed in Legal Ruxes and Doctrines (1914) 27 Hrxv. L.
195, 227; ef. Tun SPMr or THE CoiIoN LAW, 186.
The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, supra note 54, at 229.
See also CmxAL. JusTicaE N ALsrac, S.
Jusncz w Ammrxc, 57-58.
56. CRa=A-.
57. Id. at 75.
53.
54.
REv.
55.
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saw that morals could not cover the whole ground of social

Such a use of the terms "moral" and "social" evinces a wrong conception of the individual's relation to society. Pound appears to derogate
from the authority of the natural moral law by excluding from its jurisdiction an important part of the individual's existence, his life insofar
as it is social. He seems to make the same mistake, in speaking of
criminal justice, when he says an "antinomy", an "internal contradiction", exists between freedom and restraint, between the need of individual initiative and the need of social limitations upon that initiative."
Now it may be true that to adjust these two social interests is a delicate
and difficult problem, and that legal systems generally err in neglecting
one while exaggerating the other; but if Pound means only this by
"antinomy" in the section, "The Anti nomy of Criminal Justice" in Criminal Justice in America, why does he not rather include this section under
the following one, "Inherent Difficulties in Criminal Justice"? We can
only infer that he imagines he has found a fundamental and irreconcilable disunity between the social and the individual--4.e. moral-needs
of human hature. Again, when the topic is social philosophy in general,
Pound rejects individualism because for it "Civilization gets its significance as a means of educating the individual,""0 thereby implying that
in his opinion civilization has a value apart from its service of the individual's happiness, the individual's moral life.
The ultimately controlling purpose of society's operation can be found
in either the individual or in society itself: if society, then you have
collectivism, in which all personal values are subordinate to the existence and welfare of society; if the individual, then society is taken to
exist and function for the happiness of its members. Are we then to
conclude that by rejecting individualism Pound is accepting collectivism?
No, the problem of interpretation is not quite so simple. For we find
Pound characterizing social interests as "claims or demands of individual human beings when thought of in terms of social life and generalized as claims of the social group,""' -ve find him calling "the moral
and social life of the individual" "the chiefest of social interests"."2 But
if the moral and social life of the individual is the foremost social interest, why censure individualism for holding that "Civilization gets its
58.
59.
60.
61.

American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Century, supra note 8, at 166.
CanmL Jusic i AmffmcA, 54.
ERA Or AMmmcAN LAW, 19.
Tn Fop EAT
CRnmNAL JusnmcE in AM ICA, 6.

62.

TH
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=
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significance as a means of educating the individual"? It appears that
Pound's first concern is to repudiate both collectivism and nineteenthcentury individualism as they are stated by their adherents, but that he
is much less certain and clear about the positive doctrine to replace them
with. We are now looking for an ideal, he says, to guide our work of
social construction; we do not see it completely, but we do know something of its outlines, we know that it must recognize two factors that
are necessary for human progress:
"free individual initiative, spontaneous self-assertion of individual men, and on
the other hand, co-operative, ordered, if you will, regimented activity. Neither
can be ignored .... 63
Thus Pound rightly recognizes that each of the extremist views contains desirable parts, collectivism its recognition of mankind's social
needs, nineteenth-century individualism its devotion to freedom, but he
does not know how to purify these truths of the distortions and exaggerations they have suffered during their confinement in false systems.
Seeing no internal relatedness between man's social needs and his
individual needs, Pound is unable to unify them in a third and alternative picture, so he contents himself with a confused and inconsistent
eclecticism, whose unity is one not of intelligible order but of simple
arithmetic summation.
If it were possible to separate the two, we might say that Pound's
social philosophy is not to blame, but his psychology. He could easily
organize his denunciations of collectivism and of nineteenth-century individualism into an ordered system of affirmative propositions, the kind
of system of values which he himself says jurisprudence needs,"' by
simply positing a determinate human nature, an intelligible entity that
would both explain the order and unity apparent in human phenomena
and dictate a norm for man's conduct and development; and by going
on to recognize from the facts of human history that, along with
animality and rationality, this nature is characterized by sociality, and
that therefore the derived norm forbids antisocial action, including action
in violation of just human laws. Immediately it would be evident that
the individual morality is both the authoritative beginning and the
directive end of social control; that, on the one hand, society is for the
individual, and on the other, that the individual is obligated to society.
Upon such a rationale Pound could very well object to nineteenthcentury individualism and at the same time, with no violence to logic,
place the individual at the center of society. Where the old individualism
63. How Far Are We Attaining a tNew measure of Values? supra note 3, at 94.
64. See note 19, supra.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

erred was in leaving out of its notion of the individual human being the
property of sociality: its fault lay in its psychology. There is nothing
wrong with holding that civilization's only significance resides in its
function of helping the individual feed, clothe, shelter, and (mentally
and morally) improve himself, if by individual is understood a being
possessed of a social nature, that is, of social needs generating social
duties. Postulate a true psychology, and individualism is the only true
social philosophy.
But Pound has no theory of human nature. Indeed, he emphatically
denies even the need of one-this in spite of his awareness that rulers
need a positive set of values to guide them when they are determining
which out of several conflicting claims shall be secured by the law.
".. . I submit that jurisprudence can't wait for psychologists to agree (if they
are likely to), and that there is no need of waiting. We can reach a sufficient
psychological basis for juristic purposes from any of the important current
psychologies." 65
But if Pound limits his psychological credo to the tenets that modern
schools hold in common,6" it is no wonder that his jurisprudence gropes
along with a blindfold instead of an ethics. As though the law, the foremost agency of conscious social control, can promote the individual's
moral and social life without first knowing what that individual needsl
It is evident, then, that Pound's disjunction of the moral and the
social human life indicates a social philosophy essentially like neither
collectivism nor nineteenth-century individualism, but that it does spring
from a deficient psychology. For notwithstanding his declaration of
jurisprudence's independence of psychology, Pound's own philosophy of
law, being a normative science, presupposes certain psychological
premises-what else is his doctrine of the efficacy of effort but an
avowal of free will? His fault seems to consist in radically bifurcating
the natural unity of man's being and activity, in disjoining within the
individual himself the moral creature and the social. One wonders
whether Pound is not harboring in his thought a relic of the old individualism's refusal to admit that the state, over and above its power
of physical coercion, enjoys a moral claim on the individual.
65. The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 706. Note that Pound has
room for only the important current psychologies, among which he undoubtedly does
not mean to include the Scholastic theory. As far as he is concerned, the doctrine of a
will in man was killed and buried by nineteenth-century psychology, an event which he
calls a major reason for the Sociological School's rejection of the "metaphysical Will.
philosophy of law". AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PrnOSOP.UY or LAW, 90; cf. How Far
Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values? supra note 8, at 91.
66. See, for example, HEmI DER, SavxN PsYcuoLooEs (1933).
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Then the doctrine of the social interest as the end of the legal order
reduces ultimately to the doctrine of the sociality of man. Your individualist could not bear to find within the nature of gloriously freewilled man a dependence upon anything external to him, not even on
his fellows, and especially not on an authority endowed with powers of
compulsion: the law is not human, but since somehow it exists it must
be utilized for the aggrandizement of the individual free man. But
Pound sensibly takes the law's existence, and authority's existence, as
fully human beings. In this case man must be social, and society can,
with no oppression of mankind, function for its own good, the social
interest. If man is social and society does prosecute the social interest,
then individual man is the ultimate end both of society and of its instrument, the law, and the social interest is but the infravalent, though still
the proper and immediate, end of law. In this respect (if we illegitimately ignore his lack of a unified psychology) Pound, as well as the
Scholastics, could correct the current concept behind the term individualism-as Maritain did for the term humanism-and justifiably call
himself a true individualist.
Along with his aversion to the old individualism's asocial conception
of human nature, Pound feels an attraction for the medieval ideal of a
relational society, a society in which the law recognizes that stable social
relations are a necessary part of the individual human life. The social
interest can be sufficiently secured by the law only if status is given legal
sanction and accepted as an institution of at least equal utility with contract. Society is really held together by noncontractual relations, and
its interests can best be promoted by a legal system that recognizes and
maintains these relations. The ideal of a society of isolated individuals
has been tried, and it has failed: the law-in-action, formulated by judicial lawmaking, has moved steadily and surely away from contract
towards status, responding to the perceived need of the security of social
institutions. It is for the sake of the social interest that Pound endorses
this trend and appeals for a further return to the medieval ideal, an
ideal already enshrined in the authoritative materials of our own legal
system, the common law. 7
"Perhaps what is permanent in it [the medieval ideal] is its recognition of
the social interest in the security of social institutions. 0 5
"In truth, the [medieval and common-law] idea of relation responds to what
is now held to be the very nature of human society-not an aggregate of
67. THE SPMr OF THE Co-m0aN LAw, c. 1, The Feudal Ekrnet.
68. A Comparison of Ideals of Lau,, supra note 3, at 5.
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individuals but a complex of associations and relations whose inner order is
the foundation of the law." 69
2.

The Problem of Man's FurtherNeeds

The individualists who rested their political philosophy on Kantian
and Hegelian ethics exalted freedom as the goal of all action, and accordingly designated as the end of law the maximum of self-assertion. Pound,
we have seen, will have none of this dogma and offers the rOle of end
of law to the securing of the social interest. But this is only to say that
in gaining his happiness man must be social, that living socially is part
of his happiness. The question remains, What is man's complete happiness? By fixing the law's proper end as the securing of society's needs,
Pound has committed himself to the view that man is social, that he
needs to live in a social order. But mere sociality is not enough, it is
not purely by being social that man progresses towards happiness.
Pound recognizes that society-as well as society's instrument, the law
-is not an end in itself.
"In the social order .. .we have a means toward the adjustment which is
70
involved in or presupposed by life. It is a means."
"Yet cooperation cannot be a wholly satisfactory measure of values for a
system of law. For cooperation is a process. It must be cooperation towards
'71
some thing."
This is the reason why Pound insists that jurists must "understand,
organize and criticize . ..the ideals behind the legal order and in the
background not only of the judicial process but of the legislative, the
administrative and the juristic processes as well."7 2 It is not enough to
recognize that only social interests are to be favored with the law's sanction; jurisprudence must also have "A theory of interests and of ends
of the legal order. . . .a theory of values, for the valuing of interests,"7 3 "a criterion for valuing the claims, demands or desires which
69. What Is the Common Law, supra note 3, at 22. Statements like these seem inconsistent with Pound's strong dislike for "subordination" as over against "coordination".
He objects to Radbruch's theory that social life entails relations of subordination as well
as of coordination (Public Law and Private Law, supra note 8, at 474-475). But would
not a social order organized exclusively on the principle of coordination be nothing else
than a mere "aggregate of individuals"? Does Pound mean to suggest that cooperative
activity is possible without a leader vested with the power of command, without members obligated to obey? Multi per se intendunt ad multa, unuts vero ad unum. (SUMMA
THroLooIc.A, I, 96, 4.)
70. The Social Order and Modem Life, supra note 6, at 79.
71.

How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values? supra note 8, at 92.

72.
73.

Id. at 81.
The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 711.
1
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press upon the legal order for recognition and securing". 7 Not only for
Pound, but for contemporary jurists generally--except for the extreme
leftists, who deny the efficacy of ideals--"the problem of values, of a
is put in the first place as the fundamental
criterion for valuing interests,
7
problem of jurisprudence.1 6
After such a careful setting of the stage, we are let down by Pound's
own attempt at a solution. The end of the social order (ie., the ultimate end of the legal order), he says, is "the progressive development
of human powers to their highest point,"70 "the raising of human powers
to their highest unfolding," 7 in other words, "to maintain, further, and
transmit civilization". 78
"Let us think of civilization, of the raising of human powers to their highest
possible unfolding, of the maximum of human control over external nature
and over internal nature, which has enabled mankind to inherit the earth and
to maintain and increase that inheritance." 701
"An ideal of civilization, of raising human powers to their highest possible unfolding, of the maximum of human control over external nature and over internal nature for human purposes ....,s
At first sight of these declarations we are moved to ask what can be
the use of such generalities. For who would dispute them? Where is
the law whose protagonists do not proclaim as its ultimate purpose the
development of man?
Nevertheless, these expressions of Pound's half-formed social ideal
are not without significance. They do reflect certain tenets that are
not common to all systems of thought. We have already observed that
Pound's social philosophy receives its first determinations from his aversions to individualism and collectivism. Now, when he says "civilization", he has in mind the need of avoiding these two extremiss.
"Three ideals and resulting canons of value for the recognition, delimitation,
and securing of interests have obtained in juristic thought. One looks at all
things from the standpoint of the individual human personality ....A second
looks at all things from the standpoint of organized society .... A third re74. American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Cent y, supra note 3,at 163.
75.

Ibid.; cf. id. at 171: "Philosophy of law must develop a pozitive side.

Indeed,

it is very likely because it is positive rather than purely ncgative that neo-sdroLcticisim has
been spreading so rapidly." Observe that its spread, according to Pound, comes from
neo-scholasticism's being affirmative, not from its being right or true.
76. The Social Order and Modem Life, supra note 6, at 79.
77. How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of VaIufs? st pra note 8, at 95.
78, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, supra note 3, at 17.
79. The Church and Legal History, supra note 8, at 29.
So. How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values? suTpra note 8, at 94.
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gards the first two as transcended in the conception of civilization and the
values of civilized life. It reckons personality values and community values in
terms of civilization values. Individual self-assertion, spontaneous individual
initiative and free individual activity, on the one hand, and cooperation and
planned collective activity, on the other hand, are thought of as means toward
or agencies of civilization. Morals, law, and the state get their significance
as making for civilization. The highest end is civilization." 81
On the one hand, a repudiation of individualism:
"In the last century, jurists were agreed upon individual free self-assertion as
the end of the legal order. Today many, at least, see effective cooperative
activity as a means along with free individual activity toward an end of
civilization. In the last century there was general agreement in putting the
see ultisingle individual as of ultimate significance. Today many, at 8least,
2
mate significance in the highest development of human powers."
And on the other hand, a repudiation of collectivism: civilization is
not to be identified with the state. The law is a means towards the promotion of the interest of society, and society's good is something more
than the state's good, civilization is a thing "distinct from and contrasted with politically organized society." 3 Of a piece with this rejection of totalitarianism is Pound's hankering for the medieval ideal of a
universal human law; 84 the march of civilization would be greatly
speeded up if only the world would shake off its narrow legal localism
and seek a positive law transcendent to national legal systems, an
agency of social control with a jurisdiction as universal and as growing
as the world's economic interdependence. Another facet of Pound's
anti-collectivism is his ideal of authority, of the supremacy of law.8
He holds it a truth established by the whole experience of human history
that the stable and predictable social control required by civilization is
best realized when men-both rulers and subjects-postulate an
authority behind the concrete rules of law, when the action of kings and
public officials is expected to stay within bounds set by an authoritative
written or customary law. Again Pound suggests that we moderns, with
81.

THE FORmATiva

ERA OF AM.F.icAN

LAW, 18-19.

82. How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values? supra note 8, at 88.
83.

Id. at 94.

84. Id. at 88-89; A Comparison of Ideals of Law, supra note 3, at 5-7; The Church
and Legal History, supra note 8, at 3-25.

85. A Comparison of Ideals of Law, supra note 3, at 8-10; What Is the Common Law,
supra note 3, at 8-10; Public Law and Private Law, supra note 8; The Church and Legal
History, supra note 8, c. II, The Idea of Authority; A New School of Jurists, supra note 2;
Tzm Spiarr or = Com:oN LAW, c. 3, The Courts and the Crown; American Juristic
Thinking in the Twentieth Century, supra note 8.
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our waning sense of this truth, go to the Middle Ages for instruction.
Very well, Pound would have a society where the law, to the extent
that its limitations permit, helps men expand their powers, become more
civilized, increase their control over themselves and over nature. And
as means to this end he conceives of a social system organized into legally
supported relational institutions, but not so far organized that individual initiative and self-expression are obliterated; a system built upon
the postulates of authority and of a universal law. But these ideals are
still in the realm of means, and our concern is chiefly with the ultimate
end of the legal order. For what end are these instruments of social
control? Besides the concrete good of living with other men, what are
the goods that the individual will be encouraged to enjoy once he has
become a member of a relational social order maintained by an authoritarian, universalist law? Which are the human powers that the law ought
to seek to unfold?
Wants Instead of Will
The end of the social order is "the highest development of human
powers." Merely from the way he states this we are introduced to
another of Pound's doctrines on human nature, and again we see him
in the character of opponent of nineteenth-century individualism. For
the Iatter pointed simply to one human power, the free-will, as the human
faculty whose development was law's objective-as indeed it was the
objective of all moral activity, individual as well as social. Pound's
repugnance grew from his awareness of the injustices perpetrated by
the law in the name of individual freedom."s He saw, for example, efforts
to illegalize company stores blocked by the argument that such action
would curtail the freedom of both employer and worker to engage themselves in contracts of their own free making; employer would suffer an
infringement of his freedom to live his own life, and worker would
suffer in addition to this the injustice of being classified with "the infant,
the lunatic and the felon", 7 together with the indignity of becoming
the member of a caste receiving government paternalism. 3 Pound declared such a freedom worthless and inhuman and fell to questioning its
premises. The result was the simple conviction that freedom is far
from the whole of human activity. Man enjoys some freedom, but there
are other powers in his make-up, and when the exercise of freedom
S6. The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, supra note 55, at
196-19S.
87. State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 161, 59 Pac. 340, 346 (19D), cited in I.imiPr,%Tixo!s
or LEGAL HISToRy, 64.
8S. E.g., Frorer v. People, 141 IL 171, 186, 31 N. E. 395, 399 (1892) cited in The
End of Law as Developed in Legal Rudes and Doctrines, supra note 55, at 197.
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involves the neglect and abuse of these other powers, freedom ought to
be docked.
Pound's service, then, in advocating the substitution of a jurisprudence of wants for the old jurisprudence of the will, consists in multiplying the faculties of the human person insofar as he is conceived as the
end of the social order.
"At the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, a new way
of thinking grew up. Jurists began to think in terms of human wants or desires rather than of human wills. They began to think that what they had
to do was not simply to equalize or harmonize wills, but, if not to equalize,
at least to harmonize the satisfaction of wants. They began to weigh or
balance and reconcile claims or wants or desires, as formerly they had balanced
or reconciled wills. They began to think of the end of law not as a maximum
of self-assertion, but as a maximum satisfaction of wants."80s
The law must now take cognizance of human powers in the plural,
whereas before it considered only the single power of free-will deserving
of recognition.
The change is at bottom a philosophical conversion from Kantian
ethics to Aristotelian, from deontology to eudaemonism. Kant forbade
our acting for concrete goods, seeing in such action a subservience of
our free-will to substances of inferior value; a betrayal of man's crowning glory, his ability to act for duty's sake alone. Ethics presupposes
psychology, and Kant's error in psychology was Descartes', namely, regarding the material part of us as outside our essence. Pound has an
inkling of these philosophical errors corrupting the old jurisprudence,
and he calls the old view an unreal picture of man.
"Hence, today jurists approach the law from psychology rather than from
metaphysics [that is, Kantian metaphysics]. They think of the scope and
subject matter of law from the standpoint of the concrete desires and claims
of individual men in civilized society, not from the standpoint of the abstract
qualities of the abstract individual, nor from the standpoint of the logical
implications of the abstract individual free will? '0
"... the apotheosis of individual free initiative in the last century caused us
to lose sight of the social interest in the human life of the concrete man in
our zeal for the abstract freedom of the abstract man."" 1
89. AN INTRODUCrION To TOE Pnnosop" or LAw, 89; cf. How Far Arc We Attaining
a New Measure of Values? supra note 8, at 90-91,
90. CRunNAL JusTIcE n A mcA, 4; cf. How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure
of Values? supra note 8, at 90-91.
91.
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Here Pound implies a germ of the correct view of free-will in the
nature of man, and of freedom in human morality. Man never wills for
the sake of freedom alone; such a picture is unreal, what Pound signifies
when he says "abstract".
"Let us say that the change consists in thinking not of an abstract harmonizing
2
of human wills but of a concrete securing or realizing of human interests."
Man exercises his freedom in pursuit of concrete goods; Pound says
that wants are the motives, not freedom, and the Scholastic says that
the will acts for an object that appears good, rather than for the introverted intention merely of freely exercising itself. Objechtn volntatis
93
est finis.
Interests Instead of Claim
Another aspect of this revolt against Kant is of interest. Kantian
jurisprudence held that the law's job is to implement the wils of its
subjects. What the subjects will is no concern of the law's. Government, and along with it the work of the judiciary, is an amoral art.
Morality is the individual's field, to him and to no one else belongs the
business of deciding the rightness and wrongness of claims. Starting
with Jhering, however, says Pound, the emphasis veered from claims and
rights to interests.' The pre-Jhering jurists (in the measure in which
they were active in creating law) judged legal precepts according to their
effectiveness in fulfilling the subjects' claim to self-determination, their
fundamental right to individual freedom-a claim which the jurists
imputed to the subjects. Jhering and his followers, on the other hand,
posited a collection of interests behind the individual's rights and claims;
the interests are what the law seeks to implement, so far as possible,
and legal rights declare the dimensions of the realm of interests enforceable by law. After Jhering law becomes "something created by
society through which the individual found a means of securing his
interests, so far as society recognized them."01 Obviously, as soon as
92. THE SPnI or THE CommON L.%w, 195-196.
93. "Impossibile autem est quad ipse actus a voluntate elicitus Eit ultimu3 finis; m
objectum voluntatis est finis,
sicut objectum visus est color. Unde sicut inp-s ibile est
quad primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne videre est alicujus objecti visibilis, ita
impossibile est quad primum appetibile, quad est finis, sit ipsum vdlle.... QuIquid ergo
homo faciat, verum est dicere quad homo agat propter finem. ... " S s. T.oaeoYc ,
I-I1, 1. 1 ad 2.
94. Pound himself doesn't distinguish between the terms want, desire, claim, and
interest. For the sake of clarity, however, I am taking the liberty of reserving the term
interest for the concept of an objective good; I use the other terms whern the concept
excludes the normative element and refers to actually asserted or felt claims.

95. The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 30, at 143.
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jurists step behind the subjects' claims into the territory of the subjects'
interests, law and government are no longer purely an amoral art, they
are linked to the field of ethics. 6 Legislators and jurists must needs
pay attention to values; they must weigh claims against a pattern of
interests, denying some claims and securing those that appeared solid
with interests.
"In one form or another a tendency to subordinate philosophical jurisprudence
to ethics appears in all the types of the social philosophical school. As the
social utilitarians put it, the immediate end of law is to secure interests, that
is, to secure human claims or demands. Accordingly, we must choose which
we shall recognize. . . .In making this choice and in weighing or evaluating
interests, whether in legislation or judicial decision or juristic writing, whether
we do it by lawmaking or in the application of law, we must turn to ethics
for principles. Morals is an evaluation of interests; law is or at least seeks
to be a delimitation in accordance therewith. Thus we are brought back in
substance to a conception of a jurisprudence as on one side a branch of
97
applied ethics."1
Pound's subscription to this dealing in interests rather than in volitional
claims is part and parcel of his view that the law is functional, a
means to an end. The end is the securing of as many as possible of the
interests possessed by the individual.
So, when Pound says society's end-consequently, the law's ultimate
and mediate end-is the progressive unfolding of human powers, at
least this much new is revealed of his jurisprudence: no one human
power, least of all free-will, enjoys an exclusive fostering by society and
the law. The statement indicates that human nature is composed of a
multiplicity of powers, and that therefore law finds many individual
interests to serve by way of its implementation of the social interests.
And since the single power displaced by the many powers as the ultimate
end of law is the free-will, jurisprudence is handed back to the moralists,
from whose territory nineteenth-century individualism had removed it.
3. The Nature of Man's Nonsocial Needs
So far so good. Human life must be social, and the law's primary
purpose is to promote this social interest. Further, the law must recognize and foster interests that spring from life's individual character. But
of Pound's picture of the nature of these individual interests we have
learned only that it is not the nineteenth-century theory of a single
normative interest, free self-expression. Beyond that we are still in the
96.

LAW AND MoRALs, 11-12.
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dark. Pound has yet to answer the question, What is the nature of the
individual human being's interests in their nonsocial aspect?
It is precisely here that Pound falters. In the first place, he does
not come out clearly and state the nonsocial interests he deems needful
of the law's encouragement-indeed, by describing law as he does in his
engineering analogy, he ends up in dodging completely the problem of
evaluation. Secondly, what treatment he does give the subject shows
a decided list towards materialism. Thirdly, he denies any immutability
in human nature, believing that desires and needs can vary without
limit. (This third point is not dealt with in this paper.)
From his failure to present a definitive and unified picture of the
human powers the law ought ultimately to seek to unfold, we can only
infer that Pound just doesn't possess such a theory. He does have a
few words to say in elaboration of the "individual human life" when he
includes it among the social interests that the law fulfills:
"Three forms of this interest have been recognized in common law or in legislation. One might be called the social interest in individual free self-assertion,
physical, mental, and economic. Another might be called the social interest
in individual opportunity; the claim or demand, involved in social life, that
all individuals shall have fair opportunities, political, physical, social, and
economic. In a third form, the social interest in the individual life appears
as a claim that each individual shall have secured to him the conditions of at
least a minimum human life under the circumstances of life in the time and
98
place."
But here Pound is purporting only to set forth existent law, what interests it already recognizes and what interests it appears to be coming to
recognize; he is here neither approving nor condemning. In another
brief treatment of the same subject, the individual human life, he allows
a tinge of the normative to enter in:
".. . the social interest in the individual human life, the claim or want of
civilized society that each individual therein be able to live a human life
according to the standards of the society, and to be secure against those acts
and courses of conduct which interfere with the possibility of each individual's
living such a life." 9
Here the words "civilized" and "standards" bear a normative connotation, but again Pound does not commit himself to a definite view of
human nature. The powers to be unfolded by any given legal system
are those selected by the consensus of moral sentiment in the society it
governs.
9S. C RrAL Jus=c3N Ammr-c%, 8-9.
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Recall that we have already seen Pound going so far as to deny even
the need of a theory of human nature, to say nothing of its possibility. 10
Here we are meeting the jurisprudential consequences of this psychological agnosticism. It is, of course, impossible to make any predictions
about the essential human need of the future (your theory of which
affects your assessment of all lesser human values) if your psychology
recognizes no abiding essence in man. You must wait till needs show
up concretely before you can know them. And if you don't know a
man's needs, how can you legislate for their fulfillment, how can you
tell him what he ought to do? Without a philosophical psychology, i.e.,
without a unified picture of human nature, Pound is without the conceptual matrix necessary for an ethics. And if he still insists upon a
jurisprudence, it cannot be anything but a branch of art, a kind of
social engineering rather than a promulgation of "oughts".
No wonder he resorts to the current "standards of society" rather
than to the doctrines of a science of ethics for a statement and an evaluation of the interests the law ought to secure. The best we can hope
to do about setting an ultimate end for law, he says, is to generalize
from existing currents of moral opinion, find out what society seems
headed for, and then mold the law to fit society's demands, eliminating
the precepts that contradict current sentiments about justice and replacing them with rules that better express the community's will. Political philosophers must not consider themselves moralists; they are only
administrators of society's moral will, engineers whose work is confined
to the arranging and organizing of pre-existent materials. Pound himself exemplifies this function. In treating of the ethical values that the
law must subserve, he takes the attitude of an observer, not an advisor;
he speaks of the uncertainty of the present ideal that society holds for
itself: he guesses that the ideal is "civilization", but he says he cannot
"draw" this ideal from the phenomena of the present legal order as he
can draw individualism from the phenomena of the nineteenth century. 10 1
With such a view Pound cannot be expected to go any farther than
he has in his characterization of the basic nonsocial human interests.
If a jurist has only to observe and report current legal phenomena and
deduce a few cautious predictions for the immediate future, then ethical
considerations are irrelevant. But if you believe in the "efficacy of
effort", judges' creativity, and the functionality of law, then ought you
not, as a jurist, supplement your description of deliberate legal change
with a prescription of a guiding legal ideal? As we have seen, Pound
does go so far as to lay down one genuine norm for present-day reform:
100.

See note 67, supra.
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the law must be made more social. He is sure of at least one human
power whose development must be fostered by the law, that of man's
sociality; man must be governed in such a way as to teach him that
his individual happiness must be one that is compatible with the welfare
of the society in which he lives. As for the rest of the human powers
to be unfolded by the agency of the law-the nonsocial interests of
human life-society must select them for itself, without the help of any
guidance from Pound.
And what does society want right now? When one considers current
psychology and ethics, one does not wonder that Pound passes by the
job of formulating their results for the guidance of jurisprudence. Law
must conform itself to the current morality, but who's to say what the
common conscience (if any) now is? Nevertheless, Pound does betray
the possession of a general view of the nature of man that goes beyond
the mere note of sociality, in spite of the fact that in so doing he contra0 2 And
dicts his declared belief in a radical indeterminacy in nature1'
on top of it all, the two notes that I find him ascribing to his image of
man are themselves mutually contradictory--spirituality and exclusive
materiality.
Spiritual Needs
Individual self-expression is certainly a spiritual need, and we have
seen that Pound includes it among the interests that the law ought to
promote.
"Although we think socially, we must still think of individual interests, and
of that greatest of all claims which a human being may make, the claim to
assert his individuality, to exercise freely the will and the reason which God has
given him. We must emphasize the social interest in the moral and social life
of the individual. But we must remember that it is the life of a free-willing
03
being."'
We have already seen how convinced Pound is of the efficacy of human
effort. Surely if any aspect of our life bears the mark of a spiritual
origin, it is our freedom. It is hard to see why Pound does not make
the obvious inference, accept a spiritualist psychology, and then go on
102. "Is the end of law anything less than to do whatever may be achieved thereby
to satisfy human desires? Are the limits any other than those imposcd by the tools
with which we work, whereby we may lose more than we gain, if we attempt to apply
them in certain situations? . . . if in any field of human conduct or in any human
relation the law, with such machinery as it has, may satisfy a social want without a
disproportionate sacrifice of other claims, there is no eternal limitation inherent in the
nature of things, there are no bounds imposed at creation, to stand in the way of its
doing so." Axn Lnmonucrox To T=E Pnirosopny or LtW, 96-93.
103. Tim Spn=r op TnE Co _rOiN LAw, 111.
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to an ethics that formulates an ideal for human life, a natural moral
law, that rates spiritual values above material ones.
What's more, Pound is quite emphatic that justice to individuals,
and not justice to society,' must characterize the great majority of
the solutions the courts find for conflicts men get into with each other
and with society.
"An active individual popular interest in justice, a fixed and constant popular
determination to secure for everyone his due is a prerequisite of an effective
legal system .... An easy-going attitude toward right and justice bodes as ill
for law as any easy-going attitude toward politics bodes ill for government and
administration."'10 5
"Behind the ethical interpretation is the truth that men have sought to make
the administration of justice and the laws by which it is administered conform
to ideas of right and that their endeavors to do so have in large measure
succeeded. The legal order has been able to maintain itself, law has been able
to supersede the older agencies of social control and has become the chief
agency thereof, to which others are subordinated, because these efforts have been
so persistent and in consequence so successful."' 08
And Pound shows that he himself possesses the universal human sense
of justice; he inveighs, for example, against the unfairness of certain
legislation to employers and praises the courts of the last century because
"they never deliberately and intentionally subordinated the interest of
one to that of another".,0 7 Men possess the need to be treated justly; if
they find injustice characterizing any of theif many social relationships,
they will try to cut the offensive bonds, and with sufficient multiplication
of these loosenings society as a whole will fall apart. If such is the
truth, then certainly human nature includes among its needs the spiritual
one of receiving justice. To perceive an ideal just settlement of any
conflict is the work of the intellect. For to perceive the relation of justice
implies an equating of two terms, and such an act of comparing, of
seeing two objects in and through a third, is beyond the capacity of
the senses, whose material constitution confines their knowledge to
particulars; it belongs rather to a spiritual power, the intellect. The
senses have their own pecliar goods, correlative to their own peculiar
needs, but these goods are never anything but particular. The need
of justice as justice-and not as embodied in a just claim for this or
that concrete material good-is felt only by a being possessed of a
104. Note again the disjunction of the moral and the social.
105. TnE Spnrr OF THE CommON LAW, 110.
106. INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 116.
107. Public Law and Private Law, supra note 8, at 475.
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spiritual faculty that can know things as related, things insofar as they
are ordered one to another.
Furthermore, Pound subscribes to the profoundly democratic doctrine that men ought to receive equal treatment before the law. He
may not say so, but he freights this ideal with all the authority of a
natural moral law.'
Human equality is one of the unquestioned presuppositions of his ethical view. But the metaphysics of materialism
has no room for such a belief. It is only by supposing the existence
of a nonmaterial principle in the human substance that you can render
an intellectual justification for regarding all men equal.
Material Needs
Yet on other occasions, and when the topic is more expressly human
nature in itself, Pound betrays a materialist bias, thereby avowing a
view that is absolutely incompatible with the above concept of man as
partly spiritual. His favorite device for picturing the legal order as a
whole is his engineering analogy.'10 If we regard the field of law the
way we do the field of engineering, we think of law as involving processes
-- struggle against friction and waste, organization of materials, enforcement, social control-rather than merely precepts, just as engineering
is not mathematics and physics alone but mathematics and physics plus
a human activity. Then the functionality of law comes to light, for
the work of the engineer is not an end in itself but a means for another's use. Law is a job to be done, not a system of propositions to
be deduced; a means and not an end.
This is all well and good, and no doubt many jurists have lacked a
perception of these truths. But the analogy reveals also the defects
of Pound's view. Engineering occupies itself with the control of matter,
and our suspicion is that it is partly for this reason that Pound chooses
it as the law's exemplar. Observe how he equates the "goods of existence" with material goods:
"We rely upon the physical and biological sciences and their applications to
augment as well as to teach us how to conserve and to appropriate and use
the materials whereby human wants may be satisfied. These materials are
but too limited in comparison with human demands. As in the old-time
American mining community the map of a mining district shows a maze of overlapping and conflicting claims, out of which no one would have realized anything if the working of the lodes and placers, the extent of claims and the
conditions of retaining them had not been ordered and regulated, so life
108.
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in society shows a like condition of overlapping or conflicting claims in which
the goods of human existence would be lost or wasted, or at least the satisfactions derived from them would be small, if individual application of them
to individual claims and demands were not ordered. Nor may the ordering
in either case maintain itself unless it effectively eliminates friction and waste
in the use and enjoyment of the means at hand. Where there is not enough
to go round, what there is must be made to, go as far as it will."" 0
And Pound also gives his concept of "human", in the phrase "human

wants", an economic content:
"Apparently he [Kohler, whom Pound does not criticize for this doctrine]
means the most complete human control of nature, including human nature,
for human purposes, and in this respect there seems a point of contact with
the so-called economic realists in jurisprudence, who find the end of law in
a maximum satisfaction of human wants.""'
Note that Pound presents the engineering analogy to explain law
as it is in itself, law as the object of a universal science.
"All interpretations go on analogies. We seek to understand one thing by
comparing it with another. We construct a theory of one process by comparing it with another. . . Let us think of jurisprudence for a moment as
a science of social engineering, having to do with that part of the whole
field which may be achieved by the ordering of human relations through the
action of politically organized society." 112
Pound's subject here is not this or that politically organized, society,
but politically organized society taken universally; he is prescribing
the engineering analogy as a conceptual instrument for the ordering
of not this or that historical set of human relations, but of any and
every set. Then why the essentially materialistic analogy? Ought not
such a capital problem be discussed in equally universal terms and
solved by an analogy-if a method of such imprecision is admissible in
a science-that will make intelligible all aspects of the legal order, and
110. INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 157-158. See also Tna SPR or nim COMMoN
LAW, 196; INTERPRETATIONS or LEGAL HISTORY, 114; cf. How Far Arc We Attaining a
New Measure of Values? supra, note 8, at 91.
111. INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 144. Pound has, it is true, objected to the
economic determinists and to those of the Realists for whom the welfare of business rather
than society is the end of law; business, he says, is only "a special phase of the general
task of harmonizing and securing interests and upholding and furthering the social order."
The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,supra note 8, at 709. This position, however, is not
necessarily inconsistent with a materialistic view of human wants. Pound may be concerned here about other material wants than those met by business.
112. INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 151-152.
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not only those economic matters that comprise the bulk of legal business,
quantitatively considered, or that are at this historical moment the locus
of a social lag?
For it may be true that the most urgent agenda in our own legal
order are about the control of the distribution of material goods, about
the problem of remaking law in order to improve our economic system.
The individualist ideal of free self-expression has doubtlessly operated
to the economic disadvantage of the workers, and in seeking reform
of those parts of our legal system which work this injustice Pound must,
of course, stress largely the need of supplying the workers with the
material goods they ought in justice to be given. But ought our general
philosophical picture of law to be determined by the deficiencies of the
historical system under which we happen to live? It is likewise true
that most of the state's problems are economic problems-a truth recognized by Thomistic jurisprudence: justice, the essentially social virtue,
is the norm of "outward acts, whereby men live in communion with
one another,""' 3 and outward acts are largely for economic goods.
Nevertheless, regulation of economic processes is but a means towards
the common good, which is law's true end, and the common good is
larger than material prosperity.1 1 4 We must not let the superior quantitative weight of economic matters in the legal process distract us from
recognizing that qualitative primacy belongs to spiritual interests; we
must remember that the satisfaction of material needs is but a means,
a precondition, to the pursuit of the higher human values.
Again we are puzzled why Pound's lively sense of human freedom
would not prompt him to choose an analogy that would recognize this
distinctively human need, an analogy moreover that would put the individual's need of freedom on a value-plane higher than his need of material goods or his need of living in society. Such an analogy would not
deny that law must order-order justly and for the sake of the social
interest-that great majority of men's social acts that are directed
towards the satisfaction of material needs; it would only affirm, as a
113. "Lex enim humana ordinatur ad communitatemr civilem, quae eAt hominum ad
invicem. Homines autem ordinantur ad invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homine3 ibi
invicem communicant. Hujusmodi autem communicatio pertinent ad rationern juslitiae,
quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae." Smimm TnioLozc, I-iH, 10, 102.
114. "Essentially this common good is the proper earthly life of the asaembled multitude, of a whole made up of human persons: that is to say, it is at once material and
moral . . . the social polity is essentially directed, by reason of its own temporal end,

towards such a development of social conditions as will lead the generality to a level
of material, moral and intellectual life in accord with the good and peace of all, such
as will positively assist each person in the progressive conquest of the fullnes of pzrsonal
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fact and as a norm, the qualitative superiority of man's spiritual needs.
The trouble is, Pound refuses to see in his own observation of human
freedom, so solidly fortified by his large knowledge of history, a reliable
psychological premise for a value-judgment placing spirit above matter.
Fearing perhaps that it is not scientific, he turns for such premises to
the professional psychologists of the day, and of course they give him
materialism. The result for his jurisprudence is a glaring and pervasive
inconsistency. On the one hand, you have his conviction of man's partial mastery over nature-the gift of his own experience--together with
his correct apprehension of freedom's dependence upon an intellect that,
by being able to formulate an ideal, emancipates man from the tyranny,
to which all other animals are subject, of absolute determination by
internal and external nature; and in the same line of thought you have
his insistence upon the importance of evaluating those ideals of the intellect. On the other hand, there is his contradictory bent towards
determinism-the gift of modern psychology and philosophy-which
obliges him to ignore his own conviction of human freedom and to overlook the fact that the usefulness of the intellect's ideals comes from
their truthfulness. This second motif, whose development achieves a
climax in the engineering analogy, with its ignoring of the spiritual
human interests and of jurisprudence's radical dependence upon ethics
and thence upon psychology, also controls Pound's analysis of certain
ideas at the heart of his jurisprudence: authority has the character not
of a true moral attribute of a just law, but of a postulate made necessary
by the social need of certainty;:"' arbitrarinessis never action in violation of a need in human nature, it is reprehensible only because it is
unpredictable; the supremacy of law is a good. political method not
because written or customary law is more likely to be in touch with true
human needs than is personal law, but because it is more predictable
115. The Church and Legal History, supra note 8, at 43; also A Comparison of Ideals
of Law, supra note 3, at 5: "Philosophically, the [medieval] idea of authority had in
itself the seeds of its own undoing. On the other hand, juristically, it has maintained
itself. . . ." That is, the idea of authority has lost its truthfulness, to become merely a
postulate of social life.
Observe the absence of any recognition that men's acts are influenced by their conscience, their awareness of a moral law: ". . . from the standpoint of the public the
quest of authority has a twofold basis. On one side it is psychological, but on another
it is economic.
"A psychological basis is to be found in human repugnance to subjection to the will of
another and consequent fear or suspicion of arbitrary exercise of power by those who
wield the force of politically organized society. . . . On the other side, it is economic. It
rests on the need of predictability of judicial and administrative action as assuring long
term enterprises and investment of time and energy and money therein." The Church
and Legal History, supra note 8, at 32-33.
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and certain; 16 universality of law is an ideal, not because the individuals
and the communities that law serves possess common needs, but merely
because under the postulate of such universality communities will grow
in size;" 7 there should be equality under the law, not because a real
equality obtains among men's natures, but because the law's subjects
have the idea they are equal and will rebel against too much inequality.
Thus, despite his belief in human freedom" and his consequent assertion that values are of first importance, Pound seems never to advert
to these truths in developing his jurisprudence. Indeed, although he
has not himself stated it as such, his belief in the efficacy of free effort
seems to become, when he is influenced by his inclination towards
determinism, rather a belief in the efficacy of the postulate of freedom;
it is not that men are free to follow this or that ideal, it is rather that
men act according to a certain ideal if they have the idea that they are
free to act in that way; "the believers in eighteenth-century natural
law did great things in the development of American law" not because
they were free to follow that ideal, but "because that theory gave faith
that they could do them."" 9 Now if Pound really thought that men
do not possess the freedom of choice, but are different from their fellow
animals only by the fact that they are determined by new forces, the
forces behind ideals, then of course there would be no call for exalting
spiritual interests above material ones; what makes spirit superior to
matter is the enrichment of existence that it brings its possessor, its
enabling him to "become" the realities around him through knowing
them-take away man's power of knowing reality, and man truly becomes nothing but an instinct- and idea-ridden mechanism, whose only
real goods are the material goods that build and comfort his body,
and whose spiritual goods of truth, freedom, moral goodness, and reli116.

What Is the Co-mmosn Law, supra note 3, at 22: "The idea behind the supremacy

of the law responds to a deep-seated urge in human nature not to be subject to the will

of a fellowman. It expresses experience of the ill effects of repression which is sustained
abundantly by the researches of modern psychology." Thus established and traditional
law is better than purely voluntary law not because its suitability to man's needs has

been tested by time, but only because it is more predictable and therefore Eaves the
individual from the psychoses wrought by surprise and subjection to other men.
117. The Chvrch and Legal History, supra note 8, c. I, The Idea of Ur.iecrsality; A
Comparisons of Ideals of Law, supra note 8, at 5-7. The unity Pound posits among men

is the unity not of nature but of cooperation. But if men and communities do not have
common natures and common problems, why should comparative law have the value
that Pound ascribes to it?
118. "We must emphasize the social interest in the moral and social life of the individual. But we must remember that it is the life of a free-willing being." Tim SnnxT or
nH Comao- L w, 111.
EA
119. THE FoamAnv

or Aamxc.q LAw, 27.
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gious worship are but epiphenomenal fancies, coming one knows not
whence.
Besides materialism Pound's engineering interpretation of law intimates another inadmissible doctrine, one that we have already discovered
in Pound: the regarding of jurisprudence as a species of art rather than
a department of ethics. For it excludes all consideration of value.
Engineering is an amoral process; of itself it is neither good nor bad.
It acquires a moral character only accidentally, in its concrete junctions
with the ends for which its works are employed. But law ought to stand
closer to morality than this. It is comprised of rules of conduct, forms
of human behavior; by direct declaration or by less direct declaration
through the determination of general precepts these rules derive from
the first injunction of the natural law, Do good and avoid evil. Politics
is a department of ethics.
Ultimately, then, the end of law is "the progressive unfolding of
human powers", according to Pound. This is the law's "eternal goal", 2 0
although the powers themselves increase in number, decrease, vary in
kind, without cease and without limit. Who's to earmark powers for
unfolding? Not the lawmaker. His role is to tune the law to the
current morality. Society is the rightful evaluator of powers; in this
matter the legislator must be without initiative. In his engineering
analogy Pound really abandons his claimed allegiance to Jhering by
giving up interests for wants as the law's norms, and turning politics
once more into an amoral art. Unless he renounces his doctrine of jurisprudence as an art and replaces it with an honest-to-goodness ethical
jurisprudence, one that is based upon a view of man that is decidedly
more definite than can be got from the consensus of modern psychologists, Pound has no justification for criticizing the Realists' neglect of
the problem of values.'
If the only inherent and unchanging limitations on legal action are the physical ones set by the possibility of
enforcement, 22 why should the jurist look upon the legal order as anything else than a means for securing the popular will, no matter what
that will may want; why should he bother about ends when they have
nothing inherent, determinate, and predictable about them? Within the
bounds of the legal order jurists' effort is efficacious, yes, but not the
effort of changing society's will. Such change rises from the bottom, an
expression not of the law's will but of the law's subjects' wills. Lawmaker is politician, not statesman. The philosopher does have work to
do; he
120.
121.

INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 148.

122.

INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 40.

As he does in The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, sutpra note 8,at 703.
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"must be finding out the meaning of the changes which throughout the world
are going on in the body of authoritative materials of determining controversies.. . finding out upon what principles these changes may be organized,
justice they postulate, what ideal they offer us in place of that
what idea of
23
yesterday."'
The philosopher must seek to ascertain, not the true values of human
life, the objective interests-for these are inaccessible-but the already
held ultimate claims, the popular will, what the people think are their
true needs. Law is functional, yes, and as a means it can be changed
when the end requires it; but the end is outside the ruler's reach, a
creature of society's will, and the changing of society's will is the business of . ..who knows?'

Such is one man's view of the ruler's task. To lead is to follow. You
rule well only if you allow society to rule you. Like many a paradox
this one, when interpreted in a properly limited sense, contains a large
truth, one that St. Thomas and all the Scholastics express in the requirement that the law be "possible" to the subject. Nevertheless, to mold
law to the public capacity for obedience constitutes but an accidental,
however, important, part of the ruler's function. The essence of ruling
is leading-a thing impossible where the would-be ruler has no ultimate
ideal to which to mold his people.
Pound's system of jurisprudence, at first so promising in its destructive
critique of the old determinisms, collapses for lack of ethics. After
successfully unseating the physical fatalisms, which give man over to
the clubs of the subhuman world, Pound turns up empty-banded of
philosophy, and the deliverance becomes another captivity. Law is
saved from physics and biology only to be handed over to the new absolute, Society. Law has one moral measure, Society's will. To the
question, What realities ought to determine that will? we receive this
tiny, cautious answer, Pound's only normative certainty: the wants of
society must be compatible with the existence of society. The one nega123. How FarAre We Attaining a New Measure of Values? supra note 8, at 82.
124. This despairing of the possibility of a genuine science of ethics and the resultant
reliance upon the public's ipse dixit instead, this substitution, at the heart of political
science, of a sociological science of claims for a philosophical science of interests, constitutes the grounds for Walter B. Kennedy's main criticism of Pound in 1925: '"femands of
mankind are many and diverse, good and bad, moral and immoral, and it is difficult to
perceive how the magic of pragmatism can make them all 'good'." Pragmatism as a
Philosophy of Law (1925) 9 M--.Q. L. REv. 75. Cf. Sr. Tnoms AQounAs, SuruA
THEOLOGICA, I-I, 60, 5 ad 1: "just as the written law does not cause the force of the
natural-just, so neither can it diminish or annul that force, because neither can man's
will change nature."
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tive limit on the will of society, the one crime that society must not
commit, is suicide.12 5
But what of the individual? All his talk about freedom notwithstanding, Pound withholds the only freedom worth having, the freedom of a
man to fulfill his integral nature. This much Pound permits and requires: social living-the one constant in the natural human life. Except
for the property of sociality (and, of course, animality), the nature of
man is indeterminate, capable of anything and everything. Ironically,
this one true insight into the property of sociality opens the door to a
permissible and likely tyrannization. The citizen is free to develop his
need for living with other men, but he must follow that need wherever
it would lead. him; Pound brands immoral any opposition to Society, no
matter if social institutions and rules thwart other-likely as not, more
fundamental-needs of human nature. If Society wants something, each
of its members needs it; Society's wants are his deepest interests. To
differ with your group, whatever the issue, is to jeopardize the one essential and indispensable means to your happiness and fulfillment. Governments and individuals can be wrong, Society can not.
The'lack of' a complete natural law is the all-vitiating deficiency in
Pound's jurisprudence and disqualifies it as a guiding science for rulers.
His art of legal engineering may be refined and almost frictionless. It is
still not philosophy. What we need first of all is direction, purpose; a
true picture of the ideal man, built upon a true picture of the actual
man, an ideal neglecting human spiritual powers and needs no more
than it does the powers and needs of the body; an ultimate standard
for the selection of securable claims, a standard that will command us
to turn down not only antisocial claims but also claims that conflict with
man's nature in its nonsocial needs, a standard that will put man's
spiritual interests at the top of the scale of human values-in short,
what we need first of all is, not a bare technique of law, but a philosophy.
Law is for the common good, which is itself part of the good of individual men; and neither the individual's good nor, consequently, the
common good, can be known without a knowledge of human nature, the
development of whose powers is the end of the social order and therefore the ultimate end of the legal order. For want of a true psychology
and ethics Pound falls short of philosophy, a sine qua non of the science
of good government.
125.

See note 47, supra.

